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Recently, attempts have been made to extirpate legalism or talk of
rights and duties from the field of medical ethics. In particular, Prof.
John Ladd has endeavored to specify important differences between
the model of rights and the model which properly captures the ethical
aspects essential to the relationship between patient and physician. 1 If
Ladd is correct in his analysis, then the ramifications for medical
ethics will be both surprising and significant. Unfortunately, it is not
quite clear that Ladd's distinction between the model of rights and the
model which correctly characterizes the physician-patient relationship
is not a distinction without a difference . The objective, therefore, of
this paper shall be to note the results of Ladd's distinction and to
investigate whether or not differences between the two models
warrant the distinction.
1.
It is usually thought that rights and obligations or duties go hand in
hand . A right to X entails a duty suffered by all others not to interfere with the securing of X. Rights are quite often taken as claims
which are exercised against others. A right to life is a claim against all
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others guaranteeing freedom from attack, except under very special
circumstances. Needs, on the other hand, usually do not place upon
others the duty to satisfy them. Needs are not claims one has against
others. Nevertheless, a second party may be said to have a responsibility to satisfy a first party's need. For example, if one comes upon a
starving person, it would seem that one would have the responsibility
of helping the individual. We would not, however, say that the starving
individual had a right to the required food . The starving individual
simply had a need. The second party might be said to have a right to
food, for example, if the second party's food actually belonged to the
one who is starving. But if the food belonged to the second party,
then given that we all have a responsibility to relieve great suffering
when it entails no significant sacrifice on our parts, the most that can
be said is that the second party should feed the starving person.
There may, of course, be other differences between the model of
rights and the model of responsibilities. Indeed, according to Ladd,
there are four points of difference between the two models, each of
which is sufficient to exclude one modeled relationship from the
other. First, rights are "peremptory" while needs are not. Rights
impose certain duties the accordance with which is not subject to
debate. Needs simplicitor, on the other hand, impose no duties, and
behaving in accordance with one's responsibilities may be subject to
challenge. Second, no matter how dependent the parties might be
upon one another, as far as their relationship is one of right-holder and
duty-holder, the two parties are independent of each other and equal.
There is, according to Ladd, a "prior" equality between the parties.
The notion of a contract would make no sense if one party were able
to impose his will upon the other because of some inequality between
them. 2 This prior equality fails to obtain in relationships characterized
by responsibility. Indeed, in relationships characterized by the model
of responsibilities there is an assumed "prior" inequality between the
two parties. In general, the inequality intrinsic to relationships of
responsibility is exemplified in the principle: "from each according to
his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs." 3 In the relationship of responsibility, one party is in a position to extend help or
benefit while the reciprocating party stands in need of that specific
benefit.
Third, the relationship of rights assumes a prior parity between the
parties; it need not entail a respect for individual worth between the
parties. The respect which obtains in right relationships is the result of
that relationship. The respect which obtains in relationships of responsibility, however, is one of individual worth and consequently serves as
the reason for or cause of the responsible relationship being manifest.
Finally, responsibilities, it is maintained, are dynamic, while rights are
not. 4 Responsibilities change according to the changes in the needs
and circumstances between the parties. Such changes, however, do not
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affect right relationships. The increase in knowledge, for example,
obtained by one party may change or perhaps even eliminate a first
party's responsibility to a second. Such an increase in knowledge
would not however alter the rights students have against teachers.
II.

I

/'

,I

According to Ladd, the patient-physician relationship is more
appropriately characterized in terms of the model of responsibilities
than in terms of the model of rights. In some cases at least, patients do
not have a right to physician services nor do physicians have a duty to
perform the requested services. Patient requests for physician services
are not, Ladd maintains, peremptory. Moreover, patients are in need
of help, and physicians are in the appropriate position to extend the
requisite help. This need and service are the basis of the relationship
between the aforementioned parties. There is, in other words, a prior
disparity between the parties which serves as the basis of the patientphysician relationship. In addition, the reciprocal respect between the
patient and the physician exists prior to the relationship. Indeed,
respect for the physician serves as an impetus for seeing the physician
when one is in the necessary physical condition, and it is the respect
for individual well-being which initiates appropriate physician
behavior. This is not, of course, to deny that respect might not
emanate in virtue of the relationship, only that the respect which is
essential between the physician and patient is prior to the relationship.
Finally, the relationship between the patient and the physician
changes according to the health of the patient. As the relationship
changes, so also do the responsibilities. Physicians then have certain
responsibilities to patients and although not the same, patients have
certain reciprocal responsibilities to physicians. This responsibility
relationship which obtains between patients and physicians, according
to Ladd, eliminates the possibility of characterizing such a relationship
according to the model of rights.
If Ladd is correct, there are significant ramifications for the future
analysis of the relationship between mother-fetus, and possible organ
donor and possible organ recipient. Consider, for instance, the issue of
abortion. According to some,5 although the fetus may have a right to
life, i.e., may be treated as a person, it does not have a right to the
mother's sacrifice. A right to X does not carryover to a right to all
things necessary for X. Thus, although the fetus may have a right to
life, the fetus does not have a right to the mother's body which is, at
least within the first trimester, necessary for life. Therefore, abortion
on demand is not inconsistent with the proposition that the fetus
enjoys a right to life.
It may , of course, be thought that the above argument fails since it
overlooks the important fact that in an abortion the fetus is killed.
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Although a right to life may not be sufficient to guarantee everything
necessary for the actual exercise of the right, it is sufficient to guarantee not being killed. Therefore, since the fetus is killed during an
abortion and the right to life amounts to a claim held against all others
guaranteeing freedom from being killed (without due process), a right
to life constitutes a claim against all others guaranteeing freedom from
abortion. Unfortunately, there is comparative difference between the
paradigm case of wrongfully violating one's right to life and the case
of abortion which may prove significant. In the abortion case, the
fetus has been separated from a life support system (the mother's
body) to which the fetus's right to life is insufficient to lay claim. The
intention in the abortion case need not refer to the fetus's death but
merely the separation of the mother from the life-dependent fetus.
The empirical ramification of the separation is death, but death need
not be the motivation of the separation. The motivation could quite
consistently be the retainment of all that rightfully belongs to the
mother. Thus, abortion might be argued to be analogous to not saving
someone after the needy individual has, intentionally or not, placed
another in a position of saving them. The paradigm case of wrongfully
violating another's right to life, however, has none of these characteristics. In the paradigm case, if the one attacked is wrongfully not being
saved, it is only after being put in jeopardy by the attacker. Otherwise,
the attacker in the paradigm case is not merely not saving but actually
intentionally endeavoring to harm the one attacked.
Given the above remonstration, it may at least be maintained that
the pro-abortion position cannot be as easily dismissed. Nonetheless,
even if the fetus may not have a right to all that is necessary for life,
the mother may, if Ladd is correct, have a responsibility not to aboit.
There is, after all, a special relationship which obtains between mother
and fetus which, in general, is characterized in terms of concern for
the fetus. It is not, however, that the mother is, in fact, just concerned
with the fetus. Rather, we generally believe that this concern shou ld
be shown. Furthermore, the fetus is related to the mother in a way
which obviously shows a prior inequality and dependency, an inequality and dependency which may be changed through physical maturation and education. Finally, abortion may be deemed preferable on
grounds of self-preservation, or perhaps genetic defect, thus rendering
the mother's responsibility not peremptory. It seems that the motherfetus relation is, according to the above analysis, more properly
subsumed under the model of responsibilities than of rights. Although
it might very well be true that the fetus may, as a person, possess a
right to life and yet not have a right to all things necessary to exercise
that initial right, it does not follow that the mother does not have a
responsibility to the fetus, the terms of which refer to just those
things which are necessary for the fetus to exercise the right to life.
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The lack of a right to all that is necessary for the exercise of the right
to life is either irrelevant or at least not as significant as the presence
of mother's responsibility to the fetus.

I

I

Consider also the issue of organ procurement. Although we may not
have a right to the deceased's organs, we all may have, if Ladd's model
of responsibility is employed, the pre-mortem responsibility to donate
or allow the salvaging of them. 6 It might be argued that a special
relationship obtains not just between every living being and every
other but between every patient who needs a transplantable organ and
every living person who will one day no longer be in a position to use
his or her organs. If the model of responsibility is characterized by the
principle of "to each according to their needs, from each according to
their abilities," then it would seem that each of us has the pre-mortem
responsibility to donate or allow the salvaging of our organs, postmortem. The relationship between those in need of organs and those
who will someday no longer be in the physical condition to utilize
them, appears to satisfy all the conditions specified in the model of
responsibility. As was noted above, there would appear to obtain a
relation which might be characterized in terms of concern and respect
between organ needer and organ donor which is perhaps not unlike
that said to obtain between past and present generations and future
generations. Furthermore, there is an obvious prior disparity between
the parties. There is no sacrifice to be made, however, by the living as
there is in the prior example concerned with abortion. Moreover, since
it is not a right of the person in need of organs to have the deceased's
organs, the request for such is not peremptory. There may, that is, be
significant empirical considerations which will determine whether or
not a given individual should receive a needed organ, e.g. , prior rate of
success of such transplants, efficacy of transplant to abate human
suffering or death, religious beliefs of the reluctant donor, etc. Finally,
such a dependency may be eliminated once the organ is transplanted
and may even be superseded by technological advancement whereby
artificial parts are produced which function more effectively than
biological parts. Thus, each person's responsibility to donate or likewise give up one's organs might obtain only so long as there was a
need for such. Such contingent circumstances would conceivably not
affect a relationship characterized in terms of rights.
The above, if correct, constitutes an application of Ladd's model of
needs and responsibilities. Each example differs from the paradigm
example of the patient-physician relationship only in that both omit
reference to the physician. In the former case the relationship between
patient and potential patient has been investigated while in the latter
case the relationship between patient and potential non-patient has
been analyzed. This application may be taken as either the significant
result of a more correct ethical analysis of medical relationships (as in
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the case of the mother and fetus) or as a surprising reductio of Ladd's
position (as in the case of organ procurement), i.e., that since such an
application follows from Ladd's position and since such an application
is ludicrous, Ladd's position is untenable. No matter how significant
or surprising the results, Ladd's position may prove unacceptable upon
further investigation.

III.
It is obvious that Ladd intends the distinction between the two
models to be mutually exclusive. If an act is properly characterized in
terms of the rights model, then it cannot also be described in terms of
needs and responsibilities. 7 But is this presentation correct?
Ladd contends that rights and duties but not needs and responsibilities are peremptory. This, however, seems at least suspect. Rights are
never "carte blanche"; they are always circumscribed by conditions
governing application. We have a right to free speech but this does not
allow slander or the unwarranted screaming of "fire" in a crowded
theater. We have the right to freedom of religion but this does not
permit, under religious ritual, the sacrificing of vestal virgins or
perhaps, more realistically, the concomitant taking of more than one
marriage partner. Rights come, as it were prima facie or defeasibly. If
this is correct, in what way are rights and duties peremptory while
needs and responsibilities are not?
It might be suggested that rights are peremptory in the sense that
when an agent has a legitimate right to X, i.e., when the agent's right
to X does not conflict with another's right or against impersonal prohibitions, then there can be no debate over whether or not the agent
can have X. The denial of X to the agent calls for censure of the duty
holder. This may be quite true and yet fail to distinguish rights from
responsibilities. If an agent A can be shown to have a responsibility to
do X because of a special relationship with another, B, can there be
debate over whether or not the agent B can justifiably expect A to do
X? Would B's failure to do X not bring about moral censure?
Second, the concept of a contract, Ladd maintains, would make no
sense if a prior inequality between the contracting parties allowed one
party to achieve domination over the other. This, however, is a remark
about the concept of a "contract," not about the preconditions for
such. Yet it is the preconditions for the responsibility relationships
which are said to distinguish the model of rights from that of responsibilities. It would indeed make little sense in a contractual agreement if
one party could achieve hegemony by virtue of a pre-existing inequality if that pre-existing inequality were exactly what the contract was
designed to eliminate or at least circumvent. But this, of course, does
not imply that a pre-existing inequality in any way contradicts the
notion of a contract. Nor does a pre-existing inequality in any way
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Linacre Quarterly

,
\

l'

.'

I

;\

militate the possibility or freedom to engage in a contract, unless of
course, the inequality concerns the ability to engage in contracts.
Indeed, it would seem that like the relationship of responsibilities,
contracts are in many cases designed specifically to eliminate preexisting inequities. If this is correct and the notion of "freedom of
contract constitutes a basic concept in the ethic of rights," then it
would seem that even though there may be a pre-existing inequality
between the parties, this in itself is not sufficient to exclude the
characterization of the relationship according to the model of rights
anymore than it would be to exclude it from the model of
responsibilities.
Again, Ladd's third distinguishing criterion seems easily circumventable. Ladd maintains that respect for another is the result of a
right whereas such right is the cause of a responsibility. Now it may be
quite true that in relationships characterized in terms of responsibility
the relationship of respect is more narrowly defined, e.g., patient and
physician, whereas the relationships of rights are more general, e.g.,
citizen and citizen. Nevertheless, it does not follow that respect follows only from a relationship of rights rather than preceding it. We do
after all, have to have respect for others in order to accord them the
same privileges we ourselves would like to enjoy perhaps at their
expense. Indeed, it might be argued that one gains certain rights only
insofar as they are citizens, and whether or not they are treated as
citizens is in some measure due to the respect we have for them as
autonomous individuals. Again, if the above is correct, respectful
relationships may precede right relationships. also.
Finally, it is contended that relationships of responsibility are
dynamic while those of rights are not. Ladd contends that, say, an
increase in knowledge can change the prior state of inequality and
thus eliminate the state of responsibility whereas such an increase in
knowledge will not affect a right relationship. Note, however, that an
increase in knowledge only allows for the two parties to move in and
out of relationships characterized in terms of responsibilities. It does
not eliminate the appropriateness of the responsibility relationship in
those prior circumstances. As party X becomes more knowledgeable,
Y's responsibility may diminish proportionately. This, however, does
not mean that where two parties are in similar circumstances, one
party does not have a responsibility to the other. This, of course, is
true also of rights. Party X may have a right to live unless she/he has
committed murder or if a state of civil war perhaps breaks out. But
this does not mean that anyone not in the above mentioned circumstances does not enjoy a right to life. That rights are defeasible only
implies that whether or not one has a right depends upon the
empirical conditions; that one has a right to do X only so long as one
is in a particular state. This, however, is the dynamic nature attributed
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to responsibility relationships and as such fails to distinguish rights
from responsibilities. 8
If the above arguments have been successful, then, counter Ladd, the
models of rights and responsibilities are not mutually exclusive. The
model of rights appears related to the model of responsibilities so that
the satisfaction of all the conditions for the latter is insufficient to
exclude the relationship from the former. If this is true, then one
cannot eliminate one model from an area of discourse without doing
likewise to the other anymore than one can employ one model without thereby using the other. Thus, the extrapolations of Ladd's initial
positions are themselves viable positions only if the mother has a
"duty" to the fetus and ' the living have a "duty" to donate or allow
the salvaging of their organs.

IV.
It is not clear, however, that the above result is untoward. Relation-

ships of responsibility, as Ladd notes, are inspired by Kantian considerations. A person bears a responsibility toward another by virtue
of an appreciation of the individual as an end in himself. Indeed it
would be inconsistent, Ladd ,might contend, for a person to assent to
another's quality as an end in himself and yet deny any responsibility
toward him. If these are indeed the proper grounds for ascribing
responsibilities and given the soundness of the above presented arguments which concluded that Ladd failed to show a significant difference between the models of rights and responsibilities, then if we have
responsibilities toward another on such Kantian grounds, he or she has
rights against us for the same reasons. At least as presented by Ladd,
the difference between the two models resides not with the quality of
the relationship but rather with the strength of such. Some rights are
very difficult to defeat, e.g., the right to life, whereas some rights are
much easier to defeat, e.g., the right to another's organs. The difference in defeasibility of obligatory relationships is what perhaps Ladd
captured in his analysis, rather than a qualitative difference in such
relationships. 9
Accordingly, it would seem that persons in need of organ transplants have a highly defeasible moral right of some sort to a deceased's
viable organs if it can be shown that we have a responsibility to supply
the needy with organs. This right would of course not be directed
toward anyone in particular, but would perhaps justify a policy of
organ scavenging. The fact that a living person possesses - as well as
needs - his own organs is sufficient reason for allowing him to retain
his· organs. 10 Once dead, however, the original possessor of organs
loses special claim to the organs, as well, of course, as any need for
them. The needed organs should then be given to needy persons as an
execution of our duty toward them. 11
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In the case of abortion, Ladd's analysis leads to the following
reasonable consequence. If a fetus is taken as having the status of a
person, then this fact entails that other persons, notably the mother,
have responsibilities and duties toward him. This only constitutes a
strong reason to refrain from abortion. This defeasible fetal right to
life would necessitate that a prospective mother have some justification for aborting beyond mere caprice, e.g., danger to mother's life.

v.

,

It might, nevertheless, be suggested that not all patient-physician
relationships can be adequately accounted for in terms of the contractual relationship described in terms of rights and duties. To engage
in a contractual relationship with a patient, it must first be assumed
that one is interacting with an autonomous, self-directed and
responsible individual. Nonetheless, severe illness frequently results in
a state of diminished autonomy and responsibility. Although the
physician has the duty to eventually inform the patient, the physician's responsibility to the patient's well-being may call for behavior
which might be referred to as "paternalistic." Such paternalistic
behavior might be justified when - and perhaps only when - it is
designed to further enhance patient self-government (as opposed to
militating such self-regulation). Still, the physician who failed to be
paternalistic in a situation where the patient was in no position to
grant an informed consent, could hardly be considered to have done
something wrong. The physician who was, on the other hand, paternalistic in such circumstances, might be said to have engaged in
commendable behavior. Thus, it might be suggested that the distinction between the models of rights and responsibilities rests not with
Ladd's noted features, but rather in how we might appraise actions. In
general, not fulfilling one's duty in appropriate circumstances is
wrong. Fulfilling one's duty in appropriate circumstances is not praiseworthy, but necessary. However, fulfilling one's responsibility in
appropriate circumstances is not mandatory but praiseworthy. Consequently, not fulfilling one's responsibility in germane circumstances
while not commendable, need not be considered wrong. Thus the
physician must (has the duty) to inform the patient in the proper
circumstances unless the patient presently fails to be an appropriate
candidate for informed consent. In such a case the physician has the
respollsibility to help the patient regain the status of being such a
candidate.
What may result from the above suggestion is the view that the
models of rights and responsibilities, while distinct in some areas, are
not so because of considerations promulgated by Ladd. Neither are
the relationships between patients and physicians to be exclusively
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characterized according to one model over the other. Finally, just as
both models may be employed in the medical context, so also may
both be employed at the periphery of the medical context, e.g., in
cases of abortion and organ procurement.
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